Eucken zum Begriff des Neoliberalen

In der heutigen Zeit ist es zur Mode geworden, jegliche ökonomische Vernunft als „Neoliberalismus“ zu verteufeln, um sich einer ernsthaften Debatte wirtschaftspolitischer Herausforderungen nicht stellen zu müssen. Walter Eucken äußert sich in seinem Buch "Grundsätze der Wirtschaftspolitik" zu den Begriffen liberal und neoliberal folgendermaßen:

"Diese Prinzipien (Wettbewerbsordnung: Anm. d. mich MW) werden bisweilen liberal und neoliberal bezeichnet. Aber diese Bezeichnung ist oft tendenziös und nicht treffend. Tendenziös dann, wenn die Gegner sich die Kritik leicht machen wollen. Der kirchliche oder politische Liberalismus hat viele Feinde. In manchen Ländern haftet dem Wort auch die Bedeutung des Atheismus oder auch der Verbundenheit mit gewissen wirtschaftlichen Interessengruppen an. Den Strom der Kritik am Liberalismus überhaupt leitet man nun auf die Wettbewerbsordnungen und ihre gedankliche Vorbereitung – ohne selbst denken zu müssen. Diese Methode der Kritik ist alt. Gegen sie hat sich u.a. auch Kant entschieden und mit Recht gewandt. Nach dem Erscheinen der Kritik der reinen Vernunft behaupteten viele Kritiker, Kant vertrete ein System des höheren Idealismus, wie es bereits Berkeley entwickelt habe. Die neuen Gedanken Kants wurden unter einen alten Sektennamen gebracht. Kant wendet sich gegen dies Verfahren in seinen Prolegonema entschieden. Er spricht davon, dass die verschiedenen Ismen bereitstünden „als Särge um alle neuen, nicht approbierten Gedanken aufzunehmen“. Will man sich mit den Ordnungsprinzipien der Wettbewerbsordnung kritisch auseinandersetzen, so sollte man es auch vermeiden, diese Gedanken in solche Särge zu betten, um sie ohne Nachdenken bestatten zu können. Und man sollte sich die Mühe nehmen, eine eigene Kritik in realistischer Analyse der Wirtschaft zu versuchen."

Bundesliga und Zentralvermarktung

Dieser Artikel beschäftigt sich mit der Zentralvermarktung der Fußball-Bundesliga und mit der Frage welche Güter hier eigentlich vermarktet werden. Dabei soll auch die Wettbewerbsordnung, welche ein überragendes Ordnungsprinzip der sozialen Marktwirtschaft darstellt, berücksichtigt werden.

Es seien an dieser Stelle drei mögliche Ansätze betrachtet, die der Frage nachgehen welches Gut über die sogenannte Zentralvermarktung abgesetzt werden. Man könnte die Fußball-Bundesliga als ein einziges Gut ansehen. In diesem Fall wären die Bundesligavereine einzelne Produktionseinheiten die unter der Führung der „Bundesliga-Holding“ DFL zur Erstellung eines Gesamtproduktes zusammenwirken. Die Absatzmenge wird in jenem Fall auf eine einzige Einheit beschränkt. Die DFL hat ferner eine Monopolstellung beim Angebot dieses Produktes. Aufgrund der hohen Marktmacht ist es möglich einen Preis für das Gut festzusetzen, welcher höher als unter Konkurrenzdruck ist. Aus Sicht der Wettbewerbsordnung ist die wirtschaftliche Macht von partikulären Interessengruppen zugunsten der Konsumentensouveränität zu beschränken. Würde man das Monopol verbieten und Wettbewerb zulassen verflüchtigt sich die sogenannte Monopolrente. Unter vollkommenem Wettbewerb stellt dann eine hinreichende Menge von Anbietern Fußball-Bundesligen bereit und weitet die Produktion soweit aus bis der am Markt für das Produkt Fußball-Bundesliga erzielte Preis den Grenzkosten der Produktion selbigen Gutes entspricht. Zugegeben das klingt ziemlich absurd. Schauen wir uns deshalb zwei weitere Sichtweisen an.

Man könnte davon ausgehen, dass an jedem Spieltag Mannschaften der Bundesligavereine für 90 Minuten eine Art Joint-Venture eingehen um das Gut Bundesliga-Fußball zu produzieren. In diesem Fall werden pro Saison 306 Einzelprodukte erstellt. Im Fall einer Zentralvermarktung der Güter liegt ein Kartell vor. Unter einem Kartell versteht man den Zusammenschluss rechtlich und auch weitgehend wirtschaftlich selbständig bleibender Unternehmen auf vertraglicher Basis. Geht man davon aus dass die Zentralvermarktung auf eine Kartellbildung zurückzuführen ist, dann stellen die Vereine die Unternehmen dar, welche unter dem Dachverband der DFL den Absatz des Gutes Bundesliga-Fußball vertraglich fixieren. Mehr noch wäre unter der Annahme, dass eine Kartellbildung vorliegt die DFL eine eigenständige Absatzorganisation, welche den Absatz der Mitglieder abwickelt. Man spricht hier von einem Syndikat, welches eines der straffsten Formen des Kartells darstellt. Die Regelung des Marktes geschieht lediglich über die Absatzorganisation. Laut dem Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkung sind solche Kartelle verboten. Doch selbst bei einer Einzelvermarktung entsteht unter dieser zweiten Sichtweise das Problem der Kartellbildung. Sieht man nämlich das produzierte Gut als Bundesligaspiel an, bedeutet dies dass ein Mengenkartell vorliegt, welches die saisonale Produktionsmenge des Gutes auf 306 Stück beschränkt. Außerdem ist die Bestreitbarkeit des Marktes auch hier nicht gegeben. Es ist einem Verein, welcher nicht den 18 Bundesligavereinen einer Spielzeit angehört unmöglich das Gut Bundesligaspiel anzubieten (Auf- und Abstieg könnte man als ein Merkmal der Bestreitbarkeit ansehen, was aber auch eine starke Regulierung des Marktzutritts ist. Außerdem bleibt das Problem der Existenz eines Mengenkartells weiterhin bestehen.).

Eine Lösung dieser Problematik ist, das angebotene Gut allgemein als Fußballspiel anzusehen. Ein Verein kann diese Gut in beliebiger Menge anbieten. Er kann bei der Verfügbarkeit von genügend Spielern Mannschaften aufstellen, die im Wettbewerb gegen Mannschaften anderer Vereine antreten. Diese Sichtweise, wonach es sich um das Gut Fußballspiel handelt ist dahingehend problematisch, dass es sich zweifelsohne nicht um homogene Güter handelt, wenn man die Qualität eines Spiels in der höchsten deutschen Spielklasse mit jener eines Kreisligaspiels vergleicht. Diese Überlegung würde dann eher rechtfertigen das Gut als Bundesligaspiel anzusehen. Gleichzeitig funktioniert der Wettbewerb Bundesliga nur als Summe seiner einzelnen Teile. Möglicherweise ist die Fußball-Bundesliga auch ein natürliches Monopol. Will heißen, dass der Markt versagt und gar keinen Wettbewerb verschiedener Bundesligen ermöglicht, wie ihn die etwas abgefahrene erste Sichtweise impliziert. Besteht am Ende sogar ein staatliches Interesse in der Beibehaltung des status quo um das Ziel des sozialen Friedens zu verwirklichen? ;)

Dieser Beitrag dient dazu darüber nachzudenken, worüber beim Thema Zentralvermarktung der Fußball-Bundesliga eigentlich gestritten wird. Eine Lösung dieses Problems erfordert ein tieferes Verständnis der Eigenschaften des zur Verfügung gestellten Gutes, was jedoch jenseits dessen liegt, was dieser Artikel zu leisten vermag. Definitiv geht es um sehr viel Geld auch wenn Fußball nur die schönste Nebensache der Welt ist.

The Swedish Welfare System

Basic changes in the Welfare System and

the dealing with unemployment by the Swedish government

1 Introduction

2 Basics of the Swedish Welfare System

2.1 The Swedish Welfare System in general

2.2 Economic problems in Sweden since the 1970s

2.3 Changes in the Welfare Sytem in the early 1990s

3 The Swedish Labour market

3.1 The situation on the Labour market and the structure of the administration

3.2 Passive and Active Employment measures in Sweden

4 The German Labour market policy

4.1 Passive and Active Employment measures in Germany

4.2 Comparison of the German labour market policy to the swedish approach

5 Literature

1 Introduction

I want to present a general introduction to the Swedish Welfare System and then write about its changes in the early 1990s focussing on the dealing with unemployment, with a concluding view on the german reforms on the labour market in reference to social security and especially Employment measures. My aim is to draw a clear picture of the swedish social policy in cases of unemployment and to make a short comparison to the german policy.

After an first introduction to the swedish welfare system will I start to examine important changes and what the reasons therefore are. Then I focus on the situation on the swedish labour market and try to describe which social security and Employment measures the swedish state uses in cases of unemployment. At last, I will compare this to the measures taken by the german government and try to work out some similarities and differences.

This research will be based on literature. I want also use statistical data to underline the labour market situation and try to incorporate laws regarding unemployment. At the end of my paper I will write a short personal comment about unsolved problems of the social policies and mention what can be improved in both countries, Sweden and Germany.

2 Basics of the Swedish Welfare System

2.1 The Swedish Welfare System in general

After the socialdemocrats gained power in the early 1930s they had the idea of creating “home of the people” – folkhemmet – the swedish version of the welfare state. In its core should deprivation, unemployment and even class divisions become a leftover of the past. Altogether the people should feel the social security by facing the future. In his textbook A history of Sweden writes the author Lars O. Lagerqvist that an important priniciple in the welfare state was that social benefits should be universal rights untainted by the least suggestion of charity (Lagerqvist, p.175).

An important step contributing to the building of the Welfare System belongs to the Saltsjöbaden Agreement in 1938. In two-year-long negotiations designed the Swedish Confederation of Trade Unions (LO) and the Swedish Employers Confederation (SAF) rules for the labour market. This compromise regulated strikes, dismissals and redundancies. After the Second World War a universal cild allowances a basic retirement pension system as well as a general health insurance system were introduced. This long period of social reforms was made possible by Sweden’s impressive industrial growth (Lagerqvist, p.186). Altogether Sweden became a high developed social welfare state.

Based on the fact sheet The Swedish economy, provided by the Swedish Institute in 2004, are 24 % of the GDP redistributed in form of transfer payments (Swedish Institute 2004, p. 4). The state redistributes the money to pay supplementary pensions, income adjustments during illness, parental leave and unemployment as well as child or housing allowances. In Accordance to the Swedish Institute is the central feature of the swedish welfare system that it is universal, compulsory and designed to protect living standards (SI 2004, p.4). The system is financed by high taxes.

2.2 Economic problems in Sweden since the 1970s

However, first problems concerning the desgin of the well-developed swedish welfare state arised already in the 1970s. The Swedish krona could not stand its value against other european currencies. The oil shock of 1973 accrued. First wildstrikes appeared and the Saltsjöbaden Agreement was more and more challenged. Another problem was a second great wave of immigration, which had less to do with labour-power seeking work than with asylum-seeking refugees and their families (Lagerqvist, p.186). Competition from low-wage countries jeopardized traditional swedish industry sectors.

In his article How is the Swedish model faring?, published in 2002 by the Swedish Institute, concerns the author Joakim Palme that pay differentials have increased in the 1980s. There were a growing number of people moving up into income brackets that brought them above the ceiling for benefit entitlement (Palme, p.2). This was a problem for the social and unemployment insurance, while at the same time the social services were overexpanded. This led also to failures in the distribution of benefits Finally, the introduction of a big tax reform in the early 1990s worsened the situation.

Joakim Palme elaborates in his article the central problem of the reform. Wage increases and high tax rates created inflation, because the effect of the deregulation of the financial markets was underestimated. The therefore caused speculation bubble on the property market was ended by a wage stop. This in turn led to a bank crises. The reform made it also more attractive for people to save money instead of borrow. Because of that the Household demand fell down and the export industry was also not in a good shape. The swedish GNP declined three years in a row and unemployment in the open labour market rose from 1.7 to 8.2 percent (Palme, p.2). Lars O. Lagerqvist focusses also on the devaluation of the Swedish Krona in the early 1990s. The author speaks about the autumn of 1992 as that the krona was exposed to a giant wave of speculation and currency poured out of the country (Lagerqvist, p.195). To handle all these problems the conservative government of Carl Bildt initiated next to other measures cutbacks in the social sector.

2.3 Changes in the Welfare Sytem in the early 1990s

In the years between 1991 and 1994 a number of social cutbacks changed the typical swedish welfare system. The central shortage was the reduction of the sickness and unemployment benefits. The nominal child allowance sum was reduced. The indexing of benefits like pensions or the advance-maintenance support to single parents were revised. Changes in the home help service and the depletion of resources in the educational field refer also to the social shortages. These policies can also be seen as a switching to a basic security model. What was also a result of “non-decisions” whereby no changes were made in the ceilings for income on which benefit entitlement is based (Palme, p.2).

The author Joakim Palme also mentions a decentralisation trend in the distribution of public services, and a higher implementing of the purchaser-provider approach and customer choice. Market solutions become a more important role. For the welfare services sector as a whole, the proportion of private employees increased from about 6 to 12 per cent during the decade (Palme, p.3). Palme prognoses that shortages in the public services create a sense for individual coverage, which force the level of public insurances down further.

However, the swedish population trusts in the model. Remaining distrust can be obtained by the dissatisfaction with the health care system. According to Palme is a modernization of the healthcare sytem necessary as well as improvements in the sectors education, social care programmes and also rehabilitation programmes. Present problems are the long-term sick leave and the declining birth rate. In my opinion, it is an important task for the politicians in the future to react on new situations to keep gains of the welfare system like low poverty and gender equality.

The whole development of the swedish welfare system responds to different structural changes. I think this is also valid for the situation on the swedish labour market and the changes, which made it necessary for the swedish state to create measures to act on the employment situation.

3 The Swedish Labour market

3.1 The situation on the Labour market and the structure of the labour administration

In reference to the fact sheet Swedish labor market policy, published by the Swedish Institute in May 2005, the actual situation on the labour market is marked by the following attributes. In general, during 2003 the number of jobs fell by 10,000 compared to the year before (SI 2005, p.1). This trend seems to be stopped by the increasing sick leaves (compare 2.3), which lead to the hiring of temporary employees. However, the unemployment level rised in the recent years up to 5.6 % in 2004 (compare 5, Table1). Based on the data of the Swedish Institute were 76% of men and 73% of women between 16-64 in 2003 gainfully employed.

A special problem is referring to the authors of the fact sheet the large number of unemployed people with university-level education. Further forecast the authors that people without a full three-year upper secondary school education or no longer competitive skills will continue to encounter great difficulties in getting into or staying in the labour market

(SI 2005, p.3). Another problem is seen in the declining birth rate. The shortage of labour could cause problems because of the growing number of retired people, which have to be supported by the working population. The authors mention also that special groups like immigrants and people with handicaps still have problems to be intergrated in the labour market. Because of this range of problems it is in my opinion easy to state the conclusion, that the swedish government faces more problems with unemployment since the economic recession in the early 1990.

Therefore, Joakim Palme preconceives in his article How is the swedish model faring?, that an active employment policy, was designed to manage an unemployment rate of no more than 3 percent (Palme, p.2). The swedish government had to shift to passive measures in the 1990s to combat the rosen high unemployment rate. The administration for the implementing of labour market policies is federal structured.

In the fact sheet Swedish labour market policy is noted, that the swedish Employment policy has three tasks. The channeling of work to the unemployed people, combating the recruitment problem and help persons, who have obviously problems to find work on the labour market. The Labour Market Administration (Arbetsmarknadsstyrelsen) is responsible for the labour market policy and consists of a National Labour Market Board, County Labour Boards, offices of the public Employment service (arbetsförmedling) and

the Work Life Services. With these institutions tries the swedish government to fight the unemployment. The methods can be divided in active and passive measures. However, the shift to passive measures was as elaborated by Joakim Palme evident.

3.2 Passive and Active Employment measures in Sweden

According to the paper Active labour market policies, published in November 2003 by the International Labour Office (ILO) are some typical passive programmes unemployment insurance and assistance and early retirement; typical active measures are labour market training, job creation in form of public and community work programmes, programmes to promote enterprise creation and hiring subsidies (ILO, p.3). The swedish government conducts in reference to the fact sheet Swedish labour market policy the following passive measures.

The unemployment benefit system consists of an basic and income-related part. The benefits are provided by special societies, which manage unemployment insurance funds. Unemployed persons not belonging to these societies may apply for a basic benefit of SEK 320 per day (SI 2005, p.8). It is necessary to be gainfully employed to become a member of these societies. Members can receive 80 percent of the previous income up to a maximum of SEK 680 per day. This benefit is payable for 300 days. Another passive measures is the recruitment incentive, introduced in 1998. The incentive is similar to a wage subsidy paid to the employers who hire the unemployed (SI 2005, p.4). The amount of the subsidy is considered to be between SEK 350-1000 and depends next to others factors like age and work experience also on the participation in the activity guarantee program. Next to these passive measures exist a lot of active measures.

The swedish government provides so called start-up grants. These benefits are for people, who want to start their own business. With the work experience program supports the state workplace training for the unemployed. The benefits for both programs are temporary and also income-related for members of the unemployment insurance societies. Non-members receive SEK 223 per day.

The swedish municipalities are also in response for an active labour market policy. These local administrations offer the municipal youth programs. This includes work experience and training measures to prepare young people to enter the labour market. The participants receive also a compensation from the municipality.

The compensation can be seen as an activity support and can reach an amount of SEK 3,280 per month. A special youth guarantee entitles municipalities to sign agreements to offer a full-time activation program to unemployed people aged 20-24 (SI 2005, p.5). The condition is that the youngsters are registered with the Employment service. The government covers the costs of the programs with SEK 150 per day and participant.

A method to familiarise people with the information technology is the Datortek workshop. The aim is to improve the participants knowledge and using of computers and software. The benefits are SEK 223 per day but can also be income-related. The activity guarantee program offers intensive guidance in small groups for the unemployed. This measure is like an allround-program because the participants get access to all labour market policy programs. The compensation is as well SEK 223 or income-related. This depends like for nearly every program on the membership to the unemployment insurance society. So it is useful to be a member of these organisations in the case of getting unemployed. The societies are strong connected with the at least one or more Trade Unions.

A Trade Union is part Swedish Federation of Trade Unions (Landsorganisationen i Sverige). In altogether 18 sectoral unions are manual workers throughout Sweden's labour market, both private and public, organized. Based on the data of the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions are nearly 2 million members member of these Unions. It organizes a good half of all employees. The system of the providing of benefits by institutions like the Employment Insurance societies shows that also the swedish society takes care for the unemployed people and take interest in Employment policies.

Next to the measures, which fall back on insurance funds imposes the swedish government also steps to improve the labour supply. One possibility therefore is the Employment training, which is an important part of the government’s economic stabilization policy. In this program trains the government job seekers in fields where the threat exist, that in times of economic growth a shortage of labour occurs. In the growth period can the participants of these programs take an advantage in the special branches. The programs are open for both genders. The benefit for participation in a full-time employment training is an equivalent to the unemployment benefit, but not less than SEK 240 per day. Another governmental measure is the Allowances for in-house training at companies program. This is a financial subsidy to companies who train their personnel on their own to improve employee skills. Benefits to increase the mobility are the relocation grants. People who decide to work in another geographic area receive a lot of compensation. For example to cover the costs for commuting or for interviews in other localities.

Another innovative instrument to influence the labour market situation are the sabbatical years , introduced in 2005. An employee could take a working break for one year for recreation or skill improvement. Unemployed person will work as a substitute in that time and can build a stronger position on the labour market. The employee taking the sabbatical year gets 85 % of the unemployed benefit he would get in case of unemployment, but not less than SEK 320 per day.

The swedish government created also programs to integrate the handicapped people into the labour market. One form is to offer employers wage subsidies for hiring people with handicaps because of their with limited work force. The aim is that these people get the same wage. Additional costs like special equipment or wages for personal assistants are covered by governmental grants up to four years. Handicapped people can also work in the public sector (public sheltered employment) or in the government-owned corporate group Samhall AB, producing goods and services demanded by the market. When a disabled person wants to start a business guarantees the state also business grants.

All these features of the active labour market policy are used by the government to combat the high unemployment rosen in the early 1990s. A survey of the ministries of Industry, Employment and Communication and Ministry of Finance, presented in the paper Sweden’s Action Plan for Employment 2004, shows that in 2003 at total 65.5 % of the registered long-term unemployed participated in an active measure. The rate of inflow into Employment after training, retraining, work experience, a job or other employability measure amounted to 40.8 % in the same year (compare 5, Table2). The rate of long-term unemployment in 2003 is 1 %. Compared to the general unemployment rate of 4.9 % in this year, I would conclude that the active measures make an impact on the situation on the labour market. In my opinion, the effect of the labour market policy in Sweden is in general positive.

I think not only Sweden faces economic problems and has to deal with high unemployment. Many industrialized countries have to combat with rural problems like unemployment in the course of structural changes and globalization. Which Employment policies use these countries to improve their labour market situation? What is similar and what is different to Sweden? I will apply to the labour market policy in Germany in the recent years and try to compare this to the measures used by the swedish government.

4 The German Labour market policy

4.1 Passive and Active Employment measures in Germany

Based on the data of the german office for statistics (Statistisches Bundesamt) is the german unemployment rate about 11.2 % in september 2005. The rate in West Germany is about 9.5 %. In East Germany exist an unemployment rate of 17.6 %.

The aim of the german labour market policy, especially work promotion policy, is to match a high degree of Employment and combat especially long term unemployment. The time of unemployment for the individual should be as short as possible. The realizing of the equal rights has prority (§ 1 Social Security Code III).

The german government under the leadership of chancellor Gerhard Schröder introduced in 2004 four new laws regarding services on the Labour market (Gesetze für moderne Dienstleistungen am Arbeitsmarkt). The laws are arranged in the second book of the SGB (Sozialgesetzbuch), the german Social Security Code. Next to structural changes in the Labour Market Administration like the rebuilding of the central Employment agency in several private agencies, concerns the fourth law the change in the distribution of cash benefits in the case of unemployment.

The german ministry of economy and Employment quotes in the paper Informationsblatt über die wesentlichen Inhalte des vierten Gesetzes für moderne Dienstleistungen am Arbeitsmarkt , published in 2004, the details of the providing of cash benefits to the long term unemployed (Arbeitslosengeld II). A person, which is longer than 12 months unemployed and registered as a job seeker receives regulary € 345 per month in west germany and € 331 in east germany (compare 5, Table3). That is equal to circa SEK 110 per day. There are also some extra benefits like a children allowances of € 140 per month for 36 months. Furthermore equals the amount of the cash benefits 67 %, for persons with at least one children and 60 % for other persons of the previous salary for the first 12 months of unemployment (§129 SGB III). The government offers employers also an incentive to recuit new workers. The amount of the incentive can be reach up to 50 % of the salary and is paid at least 12 months (§218, SGB III). These are the main passive social security measures of the german government. Its active labour market policy consists of different programs.

One example for these measures are the grants for starting up a business (Ich-AG). According to the brochure Ich-AG und andere Kleingründungen, also published by the ministry for economy and employment, are the grants paid fo three years. It starts with € 600 per month in the first year. In the second year is the benefit € 360 and in the third year € 240 per month. In 2004 up to 175,820 people received these start-up grants in comparison to 97,253 in 2003 (compare 5, Table4). The state covers also the costs for further education, like travelling expenses, nonresident accomodation and subsistence (up to: € 340 and € 136 respectively per month), childcare (€ 130) or educational work training (§§ 77-87 SGB III).

A special youth program was initiated by the government and the employers associations in june of 2004, called the Ausbildungspakt. This is a joint job training initiative to assure that youth with limited chances on the labour market have the possiblity to get a trainee program. The industry obliged to provide 25,000 trainee places in the next three years. The Employment agencies can pay the employers a compensation for the hiring of the youth up to € 192 per month (Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Arbeit 2004b). Further, is noted in § 3 (2) SGB II, that job seekers under the age of 25 should be direct communicated to a work place. If the youngsters have not the qualification for that job should the Employment agency take care that the enhancement of labour skills at that work place is guaranteed. The state offers also exceptional grants for people in trainee programs concerning the means of subsistence (§§ 59-76 SGB III).

The government is also willing to improve the flexibility and the mobility of the unemployed persons. One method is to cover application expenses. Altogether € 260 per year for each applicant were adopted. Subsidies for travelling expenses (interviewes etc.) are also warranted (§ 46 SGB III). A special mobility allowance guarantees the job seekers a interest free loan of € 1000. The amount has to be paid back in ten annual rates. There exist also a equipment and a breakup allowance up to € 260 per month (§ 54 SGB III).

Programs to influence the labour supply were also introduced in the recent years. One of these measures is the Ein-Euro Job initiative. The aim is to create labour supply in the low wage sector. The legal basis can be found in the Social Security Code (§ 16 (3) SGB II). The initiative is created in the way that long term unemployed receive an additional income to the unemployment benefit. They can earn one or two Euro per hour for solving necessary public tasks. On the other hand get the particpants used to the rhythm of a normal work day and become so more attractive for employers. The main restriction is that these jobs should not cause extra competiton on the labour market. Participants of this program work mainly in the health- or childcare sector. The government also has social motives for that program. The philosophy is that unemployed people also suffer from a lack of time occupation. A useful work for the society could deny this a bit.

The integration of disabled and handicapped persons is also assured by the Social Security Code. The main core is the improvement of the possibilities of those persons to participate in the daily work life. The government supplies trainee programs as well as further education and provides start-up grants (§§ 97-115 SGB III).

In reference to my readings, I would conclude that the german government uses a wide range of measures and programs to deal with unemployment. The effect and impact of the measures is difficlut to observe at the moment, because a lot of programs were introduced in the recent years and lack of adequate informations. However, there are some differences to the labour market policy practiced in Sweden but it is also possible to recognize some similarities in both systems.

4.2 Comparison of the german labour market policy to the swedish approach

I think the German and the Swedish system are shaped by a high developed social security net for people getting in social distortions like unemployment. Although, there were cutbacks in consequences of economic recessions are the cash benefits still high enough to assure in almost every case the avoiding of poverty. Differences are that in Germany the income related benefit in the first 12 months of unemployment is 13 to 20 % lower than in Sweden. The swedish system of the Unemployment Insurance Societies is not established in Germany. In general shelters only the state, represented by the Employment Agency the providing of the benefits. Other passive measures like the recruitment incentives were practiced in both countries.

These similarities can also be found in the field of the active labour market policy. The governments support trainee programs, further education, cover costs caused by mobility like commuting grants. In both countries exist a system of providing start up grants and special youth programs to get rid off especially youth unemployment. The integration of handicapped people in the labour market has a high prority.

In reference to my readings supplies the swedish system a higher spectrum of measures. Features like the Datortek courses or the sabbatical years are not established in Germany. The programs to influence the labour supply are less developed in Germany as well. A reason could be that the german economy is larger and it is more difficult to create the swedish kind of sectoral Employment training because there is a lack of information about the detailed development of sectors in different economic situations. But there are german programs to influence the labour supply as well like the Ein Euro Job Initiative.

I did not examine the quality of that measures. So I can not suggest what can be improved in the execution of the different programs of the governmental labour market policy. But I want to mention what can be improved in both systems.

In my opinion, active labour market policies are a very important tool to combat unemployment. So the german government should try to create more programs and incentives for unemployed people to return in the working process. Above all considering the cutbacks in the cash benefits, introduced in 2004 (compare 4.1, Arbeitslosengeld II).

As long as the benefits guaranteed by the government and their labour market policy are affordable, there is no need of introducing larger cutbacks. The supply of measures and programs to deal with unemployment is well developed. But one problem that the swedish government should keep in mind is, that a high level of cash benefits lowers the willingness to participate in active measures. This is a big threat for the effectiveness of the active labour market policy and could undermine the best available Employment or further education training.

6 Literature (Links funktionieren evtl. nicht mehr)

Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Arbeit, 2004a, Informationsblatt über die wesentlichen Inhalte des vierten Gesetzes für moderne Dienstleistungen am Arbeitsmarkt

(Arbeitslosengeld II), Berlin

Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Arbeit, 2004b,

Nationaler Pakt für Ausbildung und Fachkräftenachwuchs,

http://www.bmwa.bund.de/Navigation/Arbeit/Arbeitsmarktpolitik/Programme-Kampagnen/ausbildungspakt,did=48252.html

Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Arbeit, 2005a, Ich-AG und andere Kleingründungen, http://www.bmwa.bund.de/Navigation/Service/bestellservice,did=29474.html

Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Arbeit, 2005b, Jahreswirtschaftsbericht 2005,

http://www.bmwa.bund.de/Navigation/Service/bestellservice,did=57518.html

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Rauchen in Kneipen Teil 1

Rauchen in Kneipen Teil 1

Wenn man sich ernsthaft mit der Diskussion um das Rauchverbot in Gaststätten auseinandersetzen will, ist es geboten sich mit den ökonomischen Aspekten des Rauchverbotes vertraut machen. Ein erster Aspekt wird in diesem Beitrag vorgestellt.

Es handelt sich um den so genannten negativen externen Effekt. Dieser entsteht durch Aktivitäten eines Individuums, welches direkt bei anderen Wirtschaftssubjekten Kosten verursacht, die der Verursachende nicht selbst tragen muss. Zweifelsohne erscheint es ungerecht, wenn das Handeln eines anderen mir schadet und der Verantwortliche nicht dafür aufkommt. Das Rauchen einer Zigarette in einer Gaststätte stellt eine solche Aktivität dar. Der Raucher schädigt den Nichtraucher und verursacht Kosten, die sich bei letzterem in langfristigen gesundheitlichen Schäden ausdrücken. Für diese Kosten kommt der Raucher als Verursacher nicht auf.

Negative externe Effekte sollten vermieden oder deren Kosten auf den Verursacher abgewälzt werden. Die Vermeidung lässt sich über ein allgemeines Rauchverbot in Gaststätten bewerkstelligen. Hierbei handelt es sich um eine „First-Best“-Lösung. Eine Lösung zweiter Wahl wäre es die anfallenden Kosten des negativen externen Effektes auf den Raucher abzuwälzen. Dies ist keineswegs durch die Tabaksteuer gewährleistet, da deren Zweck die Eindämmung des Rauchens im Allgemeinen ist und nicht der Finanzierung der Folgekosten des unfreiwilligen Passivrauchens dient. (Generell sind Steuern nicht mit einer direkten Gegenleistung verbunden! § 3 I Abgabenordnung)

Es ist schwierig wenn nicht unmöglich zu bestimmen wie hoch die Gesamtkosten des Passivrauchens in Gaststätten als Ausdruck des negativen externen Effektes sind. Zusätzlich müsste das Rauchen einer Zigarette in der Gaststätte mit einem Preis versehen werden, welcher den Kosten die beim Nichtraucher verursacht werden entspricht. Ein solches Vorgehen ist aus Komplexitätsgründen wenig praktikabel, sodass der korrekte Preis wahrscheinlich nicht gefunden werden kann. Als Folge dessen müssten pauschale Beträge eingesetzt werden. Dabei wäre es möglich, dass der Inhaber bzw. Betreiber der Gaststätte einen pauschalen Betrag entrichtet, welcher die Kosten negativer externer Effekte rauchender Gäste trägt. Das entspräche dem Erwerb einer „Lizenz zum Rauchen“. Alternativ könnte die Dienstleistung Rauchen einer Zigarette in der Gaststätte direkt mit einem Preis versehen werden.

Abgetrennte Raucherräume sind keine Lösung, da hiermit weiterhin ein negativer externer Effekt entsteht, dessen Kosten nicht getragen werden. Auch ein makaberes Verbot des Zutritts solcher Räume für Nichtraucher löst das Problem nicht, da auch Raucher durch den Tabakrauch aus der Raumluft geschädigt werden. Die Zigarette des Rauchers A schädigt Raucher B. Die Kosten des schädigenden Verhaltens muss A nicht tragen (Dem Raucher B wird diese zusätzliche Schädigung durch A wohl egal sein, aber die Rolle von Präferenzen ist ein Kapitel für sich und grundsätzlich unabhängig von der Tatsache des Entstehens eines negativen externen Effektes)

Zurück zur „Lizenz zum Rauchen“. Abgesehen davon, dass die Festsetzung eines pauschalen Betrages zur ungefähren Abdeckung nicht genau spezifizierbarer Kosten an einer ständigen Legitimation leiden würde, entsteht der Eindruck, dass sich große gastronomische Einrichtungen vom Rauchverbot „freikaufen“ können. Diese beiden Aspekte lassen es wahrscheinlich erscheinen, dass partikuläre Interessengruppen versuchen werden Ausnahmeregelungen durchzusetzen. Die Effektivität der Kostenabwälzung auf die Verursacher negativer externer Effekte wird dadurch nach und nach ausgehöhlt. Von Verwaltungskosten zur Steuerung und Überwachung dieser Regelungen ganz zu schweigen.

Letztendlich ist unter dem Aspekt der Entstehung negativer externer Effekte durch das Rauchen in Gaststätten ein Verbot dieser Aktivität anderen Lösungen vorzuziehen.

Die Betrachtung weiterer Aspekte folgt…